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IN GOD WE TRUST (UNLESS 
WE CHANGE OUR MIND): 
HOW STATE OF MIND 
RELATES TO RELIGIOUS 
ARBITRATION 
 
Skylar Reese Croy* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Arguably, binding religious arbitration agreements are constitutionally 
problematic because they hinder freedom of religion: They inhibit parties’ ability 
to change their beliefs. However, religious arbitration agreements also offer an 
outlet for the religiously inclined to further practice their beliefs. 
This Article offers a middle ground: If a party to a religious arbitration 
agreement changes religion, he or she can claim a “conscientious objector” status if 
he or she can prove the agreement violates his or her sincerely held religious beliefs. 
Courts are allowed to inquire into the sincerity of a person’s religious beliefs. The 
religious question doctrine—which restricts courts ability to decide questions of 
religion—does not apply to sincerity determinations. Courts should view 
conscientious objectors with skepticism in order to promote the national policies in 
favor of arbitration, freedom of contract, and the prevention of fraud. Courts can 
strike the proper balance between these policies and freedom of religion by using 
similar standards to those found in military regulations regarding conscientious 
objectors. 
This Article’s primary focus is on how courts can use religious sincerity. 
However, it ends by noting a second example of how state of mind can help avoid 
tricky religious questions. Recently, a former member of the Church of 
Scientology tried to escape a religious arbitration agreement by arguing it was 
unconscionable because the arbitrators were scientologists and the church teaches 
that members should shun those that leave. The court refused to look at whether 
the church actually taught this. The former member should have argued the 
individual arbitrators were biased, instead of focusing on church teachings. This 
Article concludes that the distinction between what parties or arbitrators believe—
i.e., their state of mind—and what churches teach is a powerful tool. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Susan and Boaz Avitzur “were married on May 22, 1966, in a ceremony 
conducted in accordance with Jewish tradition.”1  In keeping with Jewish custom, 
the couple signed a marriage contract known as a ketubah.2  The couple declared 
in the ketubah their “desire to . . . live in accordance with the Jewish law of 
marriage throughout [their] lifetime.”3  Importantly, this ketubah included a 
religious arbitration clause which stated: 
[We], the bride and bridegroom . . . hereby agree to recognize 
the Beth Din of the Rabbinical Assembly and the Jewish 
Theological Seminary of America or its duly appointed 
representatives, as having authority to counsel us in the light 
of Jewish tradition which requires husband and wife to give 
each other complete love and devotion, and to summon either 
party at the request of the other, in order to enable the party so 
requesting to live in accordance with the standards of the 
Jewish law of marriage throughout his or her lifetime. We 
authorize the Beth Din to impose such terms of compensation 
as it may see fit for failure to respond to its summons or to 
carry out its decisions.4 
 
The New York Court of Appeals enforced the arbitration clause.5  It found 
that the arbitration clause merely imposed a secular contract obligation.6  Religious 
arbitration agreements, such as the Avitzurs’s, have grown in popularity.7  This rise 
is primarily due to two factors: (1) the legal community’s acceptance of arbitration 
more generally,8 and (2) the thinning of Judeo-Christian values from secular law, 
                                                
1 Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136, 137 (N.Y. 1983). 
2 Id. See generally MICHAEL J. BROYDE, SHARIA TRIBUNALS, RABBINICAL COURTS, AND 
CHRISTIAN PANELS 51–56 (2017) (describing the complex nature of Jewish marriage contracts). 
3 Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d at 137. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 BROYDE, supra note 2, at 3 (“Although controversial, religious arbitration has grown immensely since 
its inception.  In fact, almost every religion in the United States has its own system for settling disputes, 
each of which function as an alternative to the civil courts.”). 
8 Id. at 5–6 (“Judges shunned arbitration for a number of reasons.  The most often cited factors were 
that arbitrators lack as robust an understanding of the law as judges, the lack of adequate judicial 
oversight of the arbitration process, and the lack of a binding effect.  As time went on, however, and 
the body American contract law developed, courts became satisfied that individuals could contract with 
one another to make their future disputes subject to arbitration. 
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which has caused Christian communities to seek their own dispute resolution 
systems.9  U.S. Courts have generally enforced these arbitration agreements by 
reasoning that religious arbitration agreements impose mere secular contract 
obligations, just like the New York Court of Appeals did. 10 
Nevertheless, civil court enforcement of religious arbitration agreements and 
awards is particularly controversial.11  Opponents’ usual argument is that religious 
arbitration relies on religious law which generally disadvantages women.12  
Furthermore, they fear women may feel pressure from their religious communities 
to submit to arbitration.13  Indeed, Ontario banned 
religious arbitration for family disputes in 2006 following a quote from a Muslim 
leader that “‘good Muslims’ would be expected to subject their family law 
disputes to resolution by the Sharia arbitration mechanism, rather than the state’s 
civil court system and its secular family laws.”14  Of course, whether these 
arguments pass muster is questionable.15  However, this Article focuses on a 
                                                                                                                     
. . . Labor unions were one of the first groups to move in, quickly embracing it and testing its structural 
soundness. . . Other groups then started occupying other parts of the house . . . . [A]s arbitrators 
specialized, groups of prospective arbitral parties were able to build de facto court systems within which to 
settle their disputes . . . . As the class of arbitrable disputes grew, so did the groups who embraced the 
practice.  Merchants, employers, and banks all began implementing it in some form or another.”). 
9 Id. at 9 (“For some time, law in the United States was in very close alignment with Judeo-Christian values on 
many issues (race being the huge area of tension). . . . As the laws and principles of Americans have continued 
to develop in a more secular direction, these religious groups—especially Evangelical and mainline Protestant 
communities— whose religious beliefs were once perfectly reflected in the law—have realized they are now 
falling into the minority. . . . As secular law loses its Judeo-Christian roots, a trend that is likely to continue in 
the coming years, the people still rooted in Judeo-Christian values and traditions will continue to find other 
means for settling their  disputes outside the court system . . . .”). 
10 E.g., Nicholas Walter, Religious Arbitration in the United States and Canada, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
501, 550 (2012) (citing Encore Prod. V. Promise Keepers, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (D. Colo. 1999) (“The court 
took the view that the agreement to undergo religious arbitration was a question of civil contract law, so a court 
could enforce it.”). 
11 See generally id. 
12 E.g., id. at 542; Lee Ann Bambach, The Enforceability of Arbitration Decisions Made by Muslim Religious 
Tribunals: Examining the Beth Din Precedent, 25 J. L. & REL. 379, 413 (2009) (“Another serious criticism 
that is likely to be leveled at the use of Muslim religious tribunals in the United States is a concern over 
women’s rights, especially women who are seen as particularly vulnerable, such as recent immigrants or those 
in abusive relationships.”). 
13 E.g., Ori Aronson, Out of Many: Military Commissions, Religious Tribunals, and the Democratic 
Virtues of Court Specialization, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 231, 241 (2011). 
14 Aronson, supra note 13, at 241.  See also Tabassum Fahim Ruby, The Question of Muslim Women’s 
Rights and the Ontario Shari’ah Tribunals, 34 FRONTIERS 134, 142–43 (2013) (discussing the 
perception of many Canadians that Muslim women were victims). 
15 “Public outcry against religious arbitration has, thus far, been confined to ‘Islamophobia’ as there has not 
been an equivalent public reaction to more well-established Jewish or Christian versions of religious 
arbitration.”  Aric Birdsell, Note, Hosanna-Tabor and Culture Gap: A Case for Settling Church & Minister 
Employment Disputes Through Religious Arbitration, 28 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.. 519, 545 (2013) 
(citing Harvey Simmons, One Law for All Ontarians, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 14, 2010, 
http://www.thestar.com/opinion/editorialopinion/article/860513-- one-lawfor-all-ontarians); see also Bambach, 
supra note 12, at 413.  Furthermore, one scholar has questioned whether civil courts are “better” for so-called 
3
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newer, less addressed argument. 
Nicholas Walter, in an article published by the Santa Clara Law Review, 
has argued that religious arbitration infringes religious freedom.16  Specifically, 
Mr. Walter has argued that people have a constitutional right to change their 
religious beliefs.17  If a court requires someone who has changed his or her beliefs 
to undergo religious arbitration, the court subjects that person to a religious 
proceeding, arguably violating the Free Exercise Clause.18  Mr. Walter has 
taken this argument so far as to suggest “religious arbitrations have a deterrent 
effect on people changing faith” and thus, that religious arbitration agreements 
should not be enforced even if no party is claiming to have changed religions.19 
Ultimately, this Article concludes that courts must allow some exception 
to otherwise binding religious arbitration agreements and awards for conscientious 
objectors thus addressing Mr. Walter’s concern.20  This Article borrows the term 
“conscientious objector” from military regulations, which allow servicemembers 
to receive discharges—and thus escape contractual obligations—for religious 
beliefs.  In the military realm, proving conscientious objector status is no easy 
task.21  This Article argues that courts should have a similar skepticism for 
conscientious objectors to religious arbitration.  Because parties need some 
predictability in order to manage their expectations and contract accordingly, 
courts should generally enforce religious arbitration agreements.  Other policies, 
                                                                                                                     
“vulnerable” Muslim women.  Ruby, supra note 14, at 149 (“Through the notion of gender equality opponents 
reproduced the notion of the ‘vulnerable’ Muslim woman who was a victim of her religion and in need of the 
protection offered by the tropes of liberal sensibilities.  This position veiled the reality that the alternative 
offered to faith-based arbitration was a family court system that was already difficult to access for many 
women, particularly those with fewer economic resources.  Critics overlooked the social realities of Muslim 
women (and men) and argued that state laws were the best mode available to protect the rights of Muslim 
women.  This claim characterized the tropes of liberal sensibilities as neutral, as if such techniques would shield 
Muslim women from racism and sexism and as if Muslim women would automatically embrace civil laws over 
religious laws upon immigrating to Canada.”). 
16 Walter, supra note 10, at 547–52. 
17 Id. 
18 Id.  Some commentators have discussed possible Establishment Clause concerns as well. See, e.g., 
Birdsell, supra note 14, at 546.  However, “[c]ourts have consistently held that the enforcement of 
religious arbitration awards by secular courts poses no Establishment Clause concerns.  Mandatory 
arbitration agreements have been consistently upheld as well.” Id. Contra Brian Hutler, Religious 
Arbitration and the Establishment Clause, 33 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 337, 338 (2018) (“[T]he 
enforcement of religious arbitration agreements may constitute a delegation to religious institutions of 
a core governmental function, namely, the adjudication and enforcement of the private law.”). 
19 Walter, supra note 10, at 551. Mr. Walter does allow for religious arbitration of questions that courts would 
be prohibited from answering under the religious question doctrine.  Id. at 553–54.  He finds this exception 
acceptable because of necessity: Someone has to resolve the dispute.  Id.  Problematically for his exception, its 
constitutionality probably cannot turn on mere necessity. 
20 Id. at 551. 
21 John H. Matheson, Conscientious Objection to Military Service, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/912/conscientious-objection-to-military-
service. 
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such as the policies in favor of arbitration and the prevention of fraud, can also be 
encouraged by such skepticism. 
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I surveys responses to Mr. 
Walter’s argument in the scholarly literature.  Part II explains a novel 
counterargument: Courts can determine religious sincerity.  The religious question 
doctrine—which limits courts’ ability to decide religious questions—does not 
apply.22  Part III explains how a court could perform a conscientious objector 
analysis in the context of religious arbitration.  Part IV addresses two 
counterarguments.  First, it explains why allowing religious sincerity 
determinations in the context of religious arbitration will not create a flood of 
people hoping to escape.  Second, it explains why the religious question doctrine 
does not apply to religious sincerity determinations. 
This Article concludes that state of mind determinations—such as 
determining sincerity—do not invoke the religious question doctrine and have a 
place in religious arbitration literature.  This Article’s conclusion briefly describes 
another state of mind determination—bias.  Courts can determine whether a 
religious arbitrator is biased because a party has left the arbitrator’s faith without 
invoking the religious question doctrine.23  In summary, mental state is a powerful 
and unexplored tool in the world of religious arbitration. 
 
II.     FREEDOM OF RELIGION MEETS RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION 
 
This part explains how scholars and litigants have reacted to Mr. Walter’s 
argument.  His argument has gone mostly unaddressed, despite being noted, with 
the exception of one article discussed below.24  Indeed, the weight of scholarly 
literature argues that freedom of religion is promoted by enforcing religious 
arbitration agreements, yet his argument stands without a proper counter. 
 
A. Mixed Messages from Professor Broyde 
 
Professor and Rabbi Michael J. Broyde’s acclaimed book, Sharia 
Tribunals, Rabbinical Court, and Christian Panels, has an entire chapter that is 
nothing but a summary of the background section of Mr. Walter’s article.25  The 
chapter contains sixty-eight citations, all to Mr. Walter’s article.26  Later in the 
book, without acknowledging Mr. Walter as the source, he stated Mr. Walter’s 
                                                
22 See generally Nathan S. Chapman, Adjudicating Religious Sincerity, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1185 (2017). 
23 Jeff Dasteel, Religious Arbitration Agreements in Contracts of Adhesion, 8 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 
45, 63–64 (2016). 
24 Broyde, infra note 31. 
25 BROYDE, supra note 2, at 71–82. 
26 Id. 
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argument “raises serious questions about whether and to what extent secular 
enforcement of religious arbitration can be achieved without seriously abridging 
individuals’ rights to freely choose, change, and practice religion as their own 
consciences dictate.”27  He acknowledged the force of an argument analogous to 
Mr. Walter’s by scholar Ayelet Shachar that ordering a Jewish husband “to appear 
before a rabbinical court . . . would have been ‘an impermissible breach of the 
husband’s constitutionally protected freedom of religion.’”28  The book, 
unfortunately, did little more than acknowledge the argument.29  In one recent 
article authored by Professor Broyde, he walked through various arguments 
against religious arbitration, and even though Professor Broyde again cited Mr. 
Walter’s article, he did not address its underlying argument.30 
One of the few responses to Mr. Walter’s argument occurs in a mere 
footnote toward the end of another article by Professor Broyde: 
 
The question of whether religious arbitration of secular 
matters could and should be prohibited by statute is discussed . 
. . [by Mr.] Walter . . . and he concludes that such arbitration 
should be prohibited.  Putting aside the religious 
discrimination problem of the government allowing all 
arbitration other than religious arbitration, I think the policy 
concerns that he worries about—that religious arbitration 
curtails the right of people to change their faith (the “exit” 
problem)— strikes me as not important when religious 
arbitration is viewed as just another form of contract.  Of 
course, by contract, one can and does abandon deeply held 
constitutional rights and loses one’s right to change one’s 
mind.  A person by contract can forsake his right to work as a 
journalist (a First Amendment right), to bear arms (a Second 
Amendment right), the right to a jury trial (a Seventh 
Amendment right), and many other rights.  Free exercise 
rights are no more jeopardized by enforcing contracts for 
religious arbitration than contractual waiver of a right to trial 
by jury endangers jury trial rights.31 
 
                                                
27 Id. at 233; accord Walter, supra note 10. 
28 BROYDE, supra note 2, at 233 (quoting Ayelet Shachar, Privatizing Diversity: A Cautionary Tale from 
Religious Arbitration in Family Law, 9 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 573, 595 n.52 (2008)). 
29 Id. 
30 Michael J. Broyde, Playground Resurfacing and Religious Arbitration Are Very Similar Activities: 
Trinity Lutheran Church as Applied to Religious Arbitration, 18 RUTGERS J. L. & REL. 298 (2017). 
31 Michael J. Broyde, Faith-Based Private Arbitration as a Model for Preserving Rights and Values in a 
Pluralistic Society, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 111, 139 n.122 (2015). 
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Notably, this footnote is at odds with Professor Broyde’s book.  More importantly for 
this Article, Professor Broyde’s footnote does not engage with Mr. Walter’s 
argument that freedom of religion is different from other rights because it is 
inalienable.32  Mr. Walter pointed out that James Madison painstakingly: 
explain[ed] why the right to religion was inalienable. It was inalienable both 
because “the opinions of men, depending only on the evidence contemplated by 
their own minds, cannot follow the dictates of other men;” and because it is the 
“duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage, and such only, as he 
believes to be acceptable to him.”33 
 
As Mr. Walter’s explained, the U.S. Supreme Court has often used James 
Madison’s language— that freedom of religion “is in its nature an unalienable 
right.”34 
 
B. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) Solution 
 
Professor Jeff Dasteel proposed a solution, similar to this Article’s, in 
order to address Mr. Walter’s argument: Use the RFRA.35  The RFRA, in relevant 
part, states: 
(a) In General   Government shall not substantially burden a 
person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a 
rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection 
(b). 
 
(b) Exception Government may substantially burden a 
person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that 
application of the burden to the person— 
 
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 
 
(2) is the least restrictive means for furthering that compelling 
governmental interest.36 
                                                
32 Walter, supra note 10, at 548–49. 
33 Id. (quoting James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES ON FREEDOM OF RELIGION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 48, 50 (John J. Patrick & 
Gerald P. Long eds., 1999)) (emphasis added).  
34 Id. at 548 & n.319 (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 53 n.38 (1985); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 
1, 12 (1947); id. at 37 & App. (Rutledge, J., dissenting); Walz v. Comm’n, 397 U.S. 705 & App. II (1970) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting)). 
35 Jeff Dasteel, Religious Arbitration Agreements in Contracts of Adhesion, 8 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 
45 (2016).  However, he does not cite Mr. Walter. Id. 
36 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1 (2018). 
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In addition to the RFRA, he argued, “where there is a sincere religious 
objection to religious arbitration in a contract of adhesion and the court is prevented 
from ruling on that objection due to the non-interference doctrine, the court should 
abstain from ruling on the application to compel arbitration.”37  For example, 
Professor Dasteel considered the Garcia case, discussed below.38  In this case, one of 
the major issues was whether the arbitrators were biased given that the plaintiff had 
left the church of Scientology and that the arbitrators were scientologists.39  The 
plaintiff, unwisely, framed his argument in terms of church doctrine: that 
scientologists were taught to be biased against him for leaving.40  Instead of deciding 
whether the arbitrators were biased, Professor Dasteel would have had the judge 
abstain from deciding the case at all, out of fear that the inquiry would necessarily 
entail looking at church teachings.41  This Article argues that bias is a state of mind, 
and thus a court does not have to look into religious teachings. 
 On a final note, Professor Dasteel, while discussing some cases, made very 
little effort, unlike this Article, to discuss what a sincerely held belief looked like.42  
He does say those wishing to escape must have a “good faith belief.”43  After 
discussing some cases, he merely states, “a court can assess whether a party asserts 
the RFRA as a defense to compelling religious arbitration based on that party’s 
sincere religious beliefs as a matter of factual inquiry, something courts are able to 
do and have done with some frequency in the past.”44 
 
C. The “Court” of Scientology 
 
In addition to scholars, litigants have also jumped on Mr. Walter’s 
argument.45  Parties hoping to escape religious arbitration agreements have 
                                                
37 Dasteel, supra note 35, at 60. 
38 Id. at 56-60. 
39 See Part VI for a more detailed discussion. 
40 See infra Part VI. 
41 Dasteel, supra note 35Error! Bookmark not defined., at 65 (“If a party to a contract of adhesion contends 
that the arbitration agreement is unconscionable on religious grounds, the court cannot make a ruling on 
unconscionability. Thus, in Garcia, if the determination of whether to grant Scientology’s application to compel 
arbitration turned on whether the religious arbitration agreement was substantively unconscionability [sic], and 
that determination required determination of an ecclesiastical issue, then the court should refrain from both 
making the determination of substantive unconscionability and abstain from deciding the motion to compel 
arbitration.”). 
42 Id. at 63–65. 
43 Id. at 66. 
44 Id. at 64. 
45 See generally Michael Corkery & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, In Religious Arbitration, Scripture Is the Rule of 
Law, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/03/business/dealbook/in-religious-
arbitration-scripture-is-the-rule-of-law.html. 
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recently started to use it—at least when talking to the media.46  For example, Luis 
Garcia, a former member of the Church of Scientology, sued the church for fraud, 
demanding it return “roughly $68,000 he had paid the church for training courses 
he never took and other expenses . . . [and] also demanding that the church return 
$340,000 he said his family had given for the construction of a ‘Super Power’ 
building in Clearwater, Fla.”47  The church moved, successfully, to enforce a 
religious arbitration clause.48  Mr. Garcia complained to the New York Times, “I 
am being forced to go before a court run by a religion I no longer believe in . . . . 
How could that happen?”49  Mr. Garcia’s complaint was essentially the same 
argument that Mr. Walter’s presented in his article: parties have a right to change 
their religions and courts should not interfere.50 
 
D.  The Need for Balance 
 
Mr. Walter’s argument needs to be addressed head-on.  Problematically, it 
has been either accepted or rejected in its totality.51  Such is often and unfortunately 
the case with religious accommodations in general.52  As Professor Shachar 
explained in the 1990s, multiculturalist literature generally argued either for or 
against accommodations.53  She argued nations must move away from “all-or-
nothing” approaches to accommodations and recognize that some accommodations 
have significant value to society while at the same time realizing accommodations 
can hurt individuals.54  The proper balance must be struck.55  This Article is a step in 
that direction.  The United States can support religious arbitration generally and at 
the same time have an escape mechanism for those with legitimate religious 
objections. 
                                                
46 Id. (“Some plaintiffs counter that it is their First Amendment rights being infringed because they must 
unwillingly participate in what amounts to religious activity.”). 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 See generally id. 
51 See AYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS 
(2001). 
52 See id. at 85. 
53 See id. 
54 Id. (“This chapter has sought to expose the fundamental problems underlying current theoretical and 
legal paradigms for dividing jurisdiction over individuals with multiple affiliations.  They share one basic 
misguided assumption: that group members cannot be simultaneously subject to more than one source of 
legitimate legal authority.  Whether explicitly or implicitly, current legal and theoretical thinking tends to 
assume that either the state or the group should exclusively govern group members’ affairs.”).  Id.  
Notably for this Article’s purpose, Professor Shachar noted the need for what she called “reversal points.”  
Id. at 122.  In other words, she believed there needed to be certain ways by which a member of a group 
could “opt out.” Id. at 122–23. 
55 Id. 
9
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III.    UNCLE SAM AS THE JUDGE OF RELIGIOUS SINCERITY 
 
Courts can achieve a middle ground by using religious sincerity.56  Mr. 
Walter stated, “[A] court would not seek proof that someone who had agreed to 
enter into Christian arbitration, was in fact, a Christian.  In any case, such an 
inquiry—determining the status of a party’s religion—would likely contravene the 
religious question doctrine.”57  Mr. Walter is wrong, and this part of the article 
lays the groundwork for understanding why.  It begins with an overview of 
military conscientious objectors.  Next, it discusses other kinds of religious 
sincerity inquiries in order to show such inquiries are quite common. 
 
A. Military Conscientious Objectors 
 
 Military conscientious objector status represents, perhaps, the ultimate 
religious accommodation.58  Before conscientious objector status, government 
overreach in the name of war was substantial.59  Conscientious objector status, as 
it is understood today, has its origins in the 1917 Draft Act.60  Prior to this point in 
history, those with religious objections to military service had little recourse.61  
During the Civil War, “the Enrollment Act of 1863 allow[ed] draftees to pay 
$300 to a substitute who served for them.”62  The Enrollment Act did little good 
for the common man, and in reality, it was mostly just a way for the rich to dodge 
military service.63  Prominent men, such as Grover Cleveland, the future President, 
and John D. Rockefeller, took advantage of the Enrollment Act.64  The 1917 Draft 
Act did a similarly poor job of helping the common man with religious 
objections.65  “In effect, . . . [its] exemption was limited to members of the 
historic peace churches.”66  Members of the Mennonite faith who refused to serve 
were often sent to hard labor camps.67  In a letter, one Mennonite wrote: 
                                                
56 See generally Walter, supra note 10, at 549. 
57 Id. 
58 Matheson, supra note 21.  
59 Timothy G. Todd, Note, Religious and Conscientious Objection, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1734, 1734 (1969). 
60 See id. 
61 Michael T. Meier, Civil War Draft Records: Exemptions and Enrollments, GENEALOGY NOTES, Winter 
1994, https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/1994/winter/civil-war-draft-records.html. 
62 Id. 
63 Matheson, supra note 21. 
64 Meier, supra note 68. 
65 Donald Eberle, The Plain Mennonite Face of the World War One Conscientious Objector, 3 J. AMISH & 
PLAIN ANABAPTIST STUD. 175, 178 (2015). 
66 Todd, supra note 59, at 1734. 
67 As one scholar noted: 
A total of 20,873 men made conscientious objector claims to their local boards, and were 
10
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Today some of us had the hardest experience that we have had 
since we came to camp. We were cursed, beaten, kicked, and 
compelled to go through exercises to the extent that a few 
were unconscious for some minutes. They kept it up the 
greater part of the afternoon, and then those who could 
possibly stand on their feet were compelled to take cold 
shower baths. One of the boys was scrubbed with a scrubbing 
brush, using lye on him. They drew blood in several places.68 
Before the United States entered World War II, Congress passed the 
Selective Service Act of 1940, which “broadened the conscientious objection 
exemption.”69  Today, individuals may not only escape military service by gaining 
conscientious objector status but may also sign away their souls to Uncle Sam and 
then change their minds.70  Department of Defense Directive (“DoDD”) 1300.06 
explains: 
a. Service member may be granted an administrative 
separation, or restriction of military duties, due to 
conscientious objection before completing his or her obligated 
term of service based on the Service member’s respective 
Military Department’s judgment of the facts and 
circumstances in the case. 
 
* * * 
d. Due to the personal and subjective nature of conscientious 
objection, the existence, honesty, and sincerity of asserted 
conscientious objections cannot be determined by applying 
inflexible objective stands and measurements on an “across-
the-board” basis. 
 
* * * 
b. A primary factor to be considered is the sincerity with 
which the religious, moral, or ethical belief is held. Great care 
                                                                                                                     
subsequently inducted into the army. Just 3,989 of these men actually claimed 
conscientious objector status in camp.  Certainly, the physical and mental duress and 
“inhuman treatment” designed to test the “genuineness” of their convictions convinced 
many to drop their claim. 
Eberle, supra note 65. 
68 Letter reprinted in JONAS SMUCKER HARTZLER, MENNONITES IN THE WORD WAR: OR, NONRESISTANCE 
UNDER TEST 123 (1921). 
69 Todd, supra note 59, at 1734–35. 
70 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DOD INSTRUCTION 1300.06 CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS (2017) (emphasis added). 
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must be exercised in seeking to determine whether asserted 
beliefs are honestly and genuinely held. 
 
(1) Sincerity is determined by an impartial evaluation 
of the applicant’s thinking and living in its 
totality, past and present.71 
 
Such an out for conscientious objectors is necessary in order to prevent 
the substantial government overreach of the past from reoccurring.72  However, it 
also presents the kind of accommodation that is most problematic: one with 
substantial externalities.73  Indeed, it is hard to think of a public policy more 
important than having sufficient soldiers during wartime. Furthermore, it may be 
unfair to let some people avoid the draft merely on religious grounds, requiring 
others to fight in their place.74  “Both advocates and critics of multiculturalism 
have given much attention to the potential for accommodation to erode the social 
unity of already diverse polities.  They are quite reasonably concerned that such 
societies will lose whatever ‘social glue’ holds their citizens together.”75 
 Nevertheless, the current regulation is quite clear: A service member can 
receive a discharge for a change in religious beliefs but only after a substantial 
inquiry into the sincerity of the beliefs.76  The fact that society is willing to bear this 
cost has two implications for this Article.  First, religious arbitration, in general, 
seems like a minor accommodation.  Second, someone with a legitimate objection to 
religious arbitration should seemingly be able to change his or her mind. 
 
B. United States v. Seeger 
 
Various religious accommodation cases trace their origin back to a case 
interpreting the Universal Military Training and Service Act, called United States v. 
Seeger.77  During the Vietnam War, Daniel Andrew Seeger had been convicted of 
“refus[ing] to submit to induction in the armed forces.”78  The case was one of 
statutory, and not constitutional, interpretation.79  The Court had to interpret, inter 
                                                
71 See DoDD 1300.06 (2017). 
72 See id. 
73 See id. 
74 Matheson, supra note 21. 
75 SHACHAR, supra note 51, at 1. 
76 See DoDD 1300.06 (2017). 
77 See generally United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).  For example, the case discussed infra, Kay 
v. Bemis, cites Snyder v. Murray City Corp., which in turn cites Seeger. 
78 Id. at 166. 
79 Id. at 176.  However, the Second Circuit decided a section of the law in question was unconstitutional 
because it “discriminate[d] against those whose sincere objection to war [wa]s founded upon grounds 
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alia, the phrase “religious training and belief.”80  The majority explained, as a 
threshold matter, a religious belief had to be “sincere.”81  The Court emphasized the 
subjective nature of sincerity and how it is different from whether a person’s beliefs 
are correct: 
The validity of what . . . [the objector] believes cannot be 
questioned.  Some theologians, and indeed some examiners, 
might be tempted to question the existence of the registrant’s 
“Supreme Being” or the truth of his concepts.  But these are 
inquiries foreclosed to Government.  “Men may believe what 
they cannot prove.  They may not be put to the proof of their 
religious doctrines or beliefs.  Religious experiences which are 
as real as life to some may be incomprehensible to others.”  
Local [draft] boards and courts in this sense are not free to 
reject beliefs because they consider them “incomprehensible.”  
Their task is to decide whether the beliefs professed by a 
registrant are sincerely held and whether they are, in his own 
scheme of things, religious.82 
 
The takeaway from Seeger is that sincerity cannot be based on the 
correctness or perceived validity of one’s beliefs.83  Furthermore, as Justice 
William Douglas explained in his concurrence, questions and doubts are natural 
and thus not alone sufficient to find a lack of sincerity.84 
 
C. Other Areas Where Courts Inquire into Religious Sincerity 
 
Notably, Seeger was a statutory interpretation case.85  However, 
constitutional claims often have a religious sincerity inquiry as well.  Inquiries into 
religious sincerity are common in various areas of law.86  In addition to conscientious 
objection status, other areas of law where religious sincerity is judged include: 
“fraud; immigration; employment discrimination; [and] prisoner religious 
                                                                                                                     
other than belief in a Supreme Being.”  Todd, supra note 66, at 1738 (citing United States v. Seeger, 326 
F.2d 846, 854 (2d Cir. 1964)).  “The Supreme Court refused to rule on the constitutional issues raised by 
Seeger.” Id. 
80 Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 at 176. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 184–85 (internal citations omitted). 
83 Id. at 176. 
84 Id. at 193. (Douglas, J., concurring) (“His questions and doubts on theological issues, and his wonder, 
are no more alien to the statutory standard than are the awe-inspired questions of a devout Buddhist.”). 
85 Id. at 163. 
86 See Generally Chapman, supra note 22, at 1188. 
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accommodations.”87 
The prisoner accommodation cases are particularly intriguing.  For example, 
Karl Dee Kay was a prisoner at the Bonneville Community Correctional Facility in 
Utah.88  He filed a lawsuit alleging, inter alia, First Amendment violations under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983.89  He made three allegations relevant to this Article:  First, he claimed 
that corrections “officials not only denied his requests for tarot cards but also 
confiscated them from him on two occasions when he brought them into [the 
correctional facility] ‘without permission’.”90  Second, Mr. Kay claimed corrections 
officials disciplined him for these incidents.91  Third, Mr. Kay alleged that 
corrections officials “prohibited him from purchasing incense, and books with 
references to magic or witchcraft on the cover.”92   
As the district court judge explained, “[t]he first questions in any free 
exercise claim are whether a plaintiff’s beliefs are religious in nature, and whether 
those religious beliefs are sincerely held.”93  In other words, a threshold question 
in the case was determining what Mr. Kay actually believed.94  The court held the 
complaint did “not allege facts showing that he was denied a reasonable 
opportunity to exercise his sincerely held religious beliefs.”95   
The district court erred by concluding the complaint failed to state a 
claim.96  It based its holding on the fact that the complaint did not identify Mr. 
Kay’s religious affiliation.97  It also noted that the complaint did “not allege any 
facts from which one could conclude that his beliefs are sincerely held,” nor did 
the complaint allege “any facts showing that the items allegedly denied to him—
tarot cards, incense, and books about magic or witchcraft—are necessary to the 
practice his religion.”98 
The Tenth Circuit noted on appeal that, as a preliminary matter, the trial 
judge was simply wrong—the complaint clearly stated Mr. Kay identified as a 
Wiccan.99  More importantly, however, the court took issue with how the district 
court reached its religious sincerity determination given the case’s procedural 
                                                
87 Id. 
88 Kay v. Bemis, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6392 (D. Utah 2007), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 500 F.3d 
1214. 
89 Id. at *1. 
90 Id. at *3. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at *7 (quoting Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 124 F.3d 1349, 1352 (10th Cir. 1997), vacated in part by 
159 F.3d 1227 (1998)) (emphasis added). 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at *7. 
98 Id. at *8. 
 
99 Kay, 500 F.3d at 1219. 
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posture: 
The inquiry into the sincerity of a free-exercise plaintiff’s 
religious beliefs is almost exclusively a credibility 
assessment, . . . and therefore the issue of sincerity can 
rarely be determined on summary judgment,” let alone a 
motion to dismiss . . . We have said that summary dismissal 
on the sincerity prong is appropriate only in the “very rare 
case[]” in which the plaintiff’s beliefs are “so bizarre, so 
clearly nonreligious in motivation that they are not entitled 
to First Amendment protection.” . . . 
 
[I]t is unnecessary for [Mr.] Kay to show that the use of tarot 
cards and the other items were “necessary” to the practice of 
his religion if his belief in their use was sincerely held.100 
 
Other cases have sanctioned similar inquiries.101  Of note, these cases often 
cite Seeger, discussed above.102 
The Tenth Circuit did note a circuit split relevant to this Article: Other 
circuits have considered the necessity or centrality of an accommodation to a sincere 
belief.103  The problem with determining necessity, however, is that it borders along 
the edge of the religious question doctrine.104  As the Tenth Circuit noted, “courts 
have rightly shied away from attempting to gauge how central a sincerely held belief 
is to the believer’s religion.”105 
 
IV.   UNCLE SAM CAN SOLVE MR. WALTER’S CONCERN  
 
Recall that Mr. Walter’s primary concern with religious arbitration was that 
it limited religious freedom by constraining parties’ ability to change or abandon 
their religious beliefs.106  However, because courts can inquire into the sincerity of 
religious beliefs, Mr. Walter’s concern is of limited significance.  This Part draws on 
military regulations for determining conscientious objector status ultimately arguing 
courts could make a similar inquiry in order to determine whether someone should 
be released from a religious arbitration agreement.  The burden on a party seeking to 
                                                
100 Id. at 1219–20 (quoting Snyder, 124 F.3d at 1352–53). 
101 E.g., Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 274–75 (2d Cir. 2006) (“The prisoner must show at the 
threshold that the disputed conduct substantially burdens his sincerely held religious beliefs.”); Ford v. 
McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 588–91 (2d Cir. 2003). 
102 Ford, 352 F.3d at 588 (quoting United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965)). 
103 Kay, 500 F.3d at 1220 (citing Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
104 See generally Walter, supra note 10, at 523. 
105 Kay, 500 F.3d at 1220 (quoting Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2007)). 
106 See generally Walter, supra note 10, at 549-52. 
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exit a religious arbitration agreement ought to be high in order to further three 
policies: (1) the national policy in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements; (2) 
freedom of contract; and (3) the prevention of fraud. 107   Thankfully, as this part 
shows, the standard relied on by the military is quite difficult to meet. 
 
A. The Military’s Eight Step Process 
 
The military uses an eight-step process: 
[1.] The service member submits an application for 
conscientious objector status [to the commanding 
officer.] 
[2.] The commanding officer . . . assigns a military 
chaplain and a psychiatrist to conduct required 
interviews. 
[3.] The applicant’s commanding officer appoints 
an investigating officer. 
[4.] The investigating officer holds an informal 
hearing. 
[5.] The investigating officer prepares a report, 
including a recommendation to approve or deny 
the application. 
[6.] The commanding officer reviews the record 
and makes a recommendation to approve or deny 
the application. 
[7.] [The] authorized official or board [reviews the 
record and] makes the final decision [to either 
approve or deny the application] and informs the 
commanding officer. 
[8.] The commanding officer . . . informs the 
applicant of the final decision. 108 
 
 A few takeaways are important from this process.  First, note that the 
process involves a religious expert, the chaplain, a mental health professional, and 
the psychiatrist, who makes reports that are a part of the official record.109  The use 
                                                
107 Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 588 (2008) (stating that §§ 9–11 of the Federal 
Arbitration Act should be read as substantiating a national policy favoring arbitration with limited review 
needed to maintain arbitration’s essential function of resolving disputes). 
 
108 GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MILITARY PERSONNEL: NUMBER OF FORMALLY REPORTED 
APPLICATIONS FOR CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS IS SMALL RELATIVE TO THE TOTAL SIZE OF THE ARMED 
FORCES12–13 (2007), https://www.gao.gov/assets/270/267693.pdf. 
109 Id. 
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of these professionals must be with great care: religious sincerity determinations are 
not to reference accuracy or implausibility.110  The experts are there to help 
determine the credibility of the purported beliefs, but they have to understand what 
they are allowed to consider in their roles.111  The chaplain’s report is merely an 
“opinion on the sincerity and depth of the applicant’s conviction . . . .”112  Similarly, 
the psychiatrist’s report is a medical evaluation.113   
Second, “[t]he applicant must present clear and convincing evidence of 
meeting all of the criteria for conscientious objector status.”114  They must meet this 
burden on three separate elements: “(1) they are opposed to participation in any form 
of war; (2) their opposition is based on religious ethical, or moral beliefs; and (3) 
their beliefs are sincere and deeply held.”115   
The first element means that a servicemember cannot be a “selective 
conscientious objector.”116  In other words, the applicant must oppose all war.117  For 
example, a Muslim could not object to war with a primarily Muslim nation on the 
ground that Muslims believe it is wrong to kill other Muslims.118  The other two 
elements relate to the nature and significance of the belief.119  Likely, any successful 
applicant will have to show these two elements by evidence of change in his or her 
life.120  Recall Department of Defense Instruction 1300.06 states that “[s]incerity is 
determined by an impartial evaluation of the applicant’s thinking and living in its 
totality, past and present.”121  This statement suggests that how the applicant’s life 
has changed is critical.122  What triggered the change?  Did the applicant start 
attending religious ceremonies?  Did the applicant begin going to Bible study?  How 
significant was this life event?  Are there witnesses that can attest the applicant has 
been reading a holy book for a significant period?  Has the applicant voiced concern 
to witnesses over a prolonged period?  
                                                
110 See generally Chapman, supra note 22, at 1185. 
111 See generally GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 108, at 12. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 13. 
115 Id. at 6. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 See Liz Halloran, Will Hassan Case Prompt New Look at Objector Rules?, NPR (Nov. 13, 2009, 8:05 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=120354216. 
119 GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 108, at 1–2.   
120 Id.  For example, a servicemember might point to a conversion to a different religion. 
121 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DOD INSTRUCTION 1300.06 CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS (2017) (emphasis added). 
122 DoDD 1300.06 at page 7 (when outlining what the application must include, the instruction states “(2) How 
the applicant’s beliefs changed or developed to include an explanation as to what factors (how, when, and from 
whom or from what source training was received or belief acquired) caused the change in or development of 
conscientious objector beliefs.”) 
https://centeronconscience.org/files/DODI_2017.pdf. 
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Perhaps one of the more telling examples of a change is the story of Joshua 
Casteel, who the Smithsonian has labeled, “The Priest of Abu Ghraib.”123  Mr. 
Casteel was a young 24-year-old interrogator in a military intelligence unit.124  Mr. 
Casteel deployed to Abu Ghraib a mere “six weeks after the revelation[s] of prisoner 
torture and abuse . . . shocked the world.”125  Notably, shortly before the deployment, 
Mr. Casteel had been accepted to the seminary.126  He already had doubts about war 
at this point, but he figured he could do it nonetheless.127  In an email, he explained 
he felt he could bring a sense of “moral order to the interrogation room.”128   
Mr. Casteel soon realized how naïve he had been.129  He began to feel “an 
overwhelming burden to atone for what . . . [he] considered the sin of reducing 
individuals to strategic ‘objects of exploitation.’ ”130  He began seeking out a 
chaplain after each and every interrogation to hear his confession.131  He stopped 
eating lunch with his compatriots, choosing instead to eat with locals.132  He yo-
yoed in weight, he smoked, and he drank “excessive amounts of coffee,” in an 
attempt to relieve his stress.133  “He stayed up late reading because he didn’t want 
the next day to come.”134  Reportedly, “[h]e read so much that even during mortar 
attacks he shopped for new books on Amazon.”135  Typically, the books Mr. 
Casteel was reading had to do with “Christian pacifism.”136  Mr. Casteel was able 
to identify a specific moment his worldview, which permitted war, came crashing 
down: he asked a prisoner, “[w]hy did you come to Iraq to kill,” and the prisoner 
rhetorically asked him the same question.137  Mr. Casteel continued the 
interrogation, but had to stop shortly after and tell his superiors someone else 
needed to take over.138  He later applied for conscientious objector status.139   
Mr. Casteel was able to point to a specific trigger: being an interrogator at 
Abu Ghraib.140 Indeed, he could pinpoint the exact moment his worldview 
                                                
123 Jennifer Percy, The Priset of Abu Ghraib, SMITHSONIAN.COM: AM. AT WAR (Jan. 2019), 
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/priest-abu-grahib-180971013/#ErrwxF8uUuvkFxfU.99. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
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changed: the prisoner’s rhetorical question.141  Furthermore, his high stress level 
was evident from his yo-yoing weight fluctuations and cigarette use.142  Mr. 
Casteel could further show this stress was caused by his conflicted morality, as 
shown by him starting to go to a chaplain after each and every interrogation.143  
He also started to read books about Christian pacifism.144  These are the kinds of 
life events that suggest a sincere change (or perhaps in Mr. Casteel’s case, 
realization) of beliefs.145 
 
B. The Analogous Procedures for Religious Arbitration 
 
These procedures can be paralleled with religious arbitration.146  First, the 
burden of proof should be on the party seeking to escape enforcement.147  Like in 
the military, the standard of proof should be clear and convincing evidence.148  
The party will have to show a change in his or her lifestyle that corresponds with 
the change in beliefs, similar to Mr. Casteel’s story.149 
Parties should identify triggering life events of such significance that they 
reasonably may result in a change of beliefs.150  Mr. Garcia, the former 
Scientologist discussed above, explained that he became skeptical once he 
“reached the highest level in Scientology, where he said all of one’s past lives are 
supposed to be easily recalled.”151  He was unable to recall his past lives.152  He 
also learned money he donated had been misappropriated, which led him to 
believe the church was a scam.153   
The party may also have to call expert witnesses.154  In particular, a 
religious expert and mental health professionals would be useful.155  The experts 
would testify to their opinions about the nature and sincerity of the beliefs; they 
                                                
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 See Michael Broyde, The Rise and Rise of Religious Arbitration, THE WASH. POST (June 26, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/06/26/the-rise-and-rise-of-religious-
arbitration/?noredirect=on (discussing the rise of religious arbitration). 
147 See Bill Galvin, The Guide for COs in the Military, CTR. ON CONSCIENCE & WAR (Aug. 2019), 
http://www.centeronconscience.org/images/stories/pdf/The_Guide_for_COs_in_the_Military.pdf. 
148 See id. 
149 Percy, supra note 123 (discussing Mr. Casteel’s story). 
150 Id. 
151 Corkery & Silver-Greenberg, supra note 45. 
152 Id. 
153 Scientologists Sue Church for Fraud, YOUTUBE: ACTION NEWS (Jan. 23, 2013), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g2nZ9nJQqGU. 
154 See Galvin, supra note 147. 
155 See id. (discussing other elements of the process). 
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would not testify or even base their opinions on accuracy or implausibility.156 
The religious arbitration literature already contains one idea that might be 
helpful in this inquiry. Ontario Attorney General Marion Boyd noted when 
Ontario was considering a ban on religious arbitration, “Part IV of the Family Law 
Act should be amended so that if a co- habitation agreement or marriage contract 
contains an arbitration agreement, that arbitration agreement is not binding unless 
it is reconfirmed in writing at the time of the dispute and before arbitration 
occurs.”157  A pre-verse, post-dispute distinction is one factor to consider in a 
religious sincerity determination because the amount of time between the 
agreement’s origin and the dispute correlates with the probability of a change of 
belief.158  Furthermore, a party would probably have to raise the argument before 
arbitration.  A mere challenge to an arbitration award, after one has lost, seems 
much less sincere. 
The exact nature these inquiries could take is hard to pin down.  As the 
military regulations acknowledge, religious sincerity determinations do not lend well 
to any particular criteria.159  Although the lack of objective criteria is problematic, it 
is no more problematic in the context of religious arbitration than in the context of 
the military. 
 
V.   SOME ELEPHANTS IN THE ROOM: OPENING A FLOODGATE AND THE 
RELIGIOUS QUESTION DOCTRINE 
 
This Part addresses two counterarguments. First, will permitting some 
parties to escape religious arbitration on the ground that they changed beliefs open 
a floodgate?  Second, why does the religious question doctrine not apply? 
 
A. Empirical Data on Conscientious Objectors 
 
One of the primary objections to using religious sincerity as an escape 
from religious arbitration agreements might be that it would be too easy for parties 
to disregard their obligations.160 However, the empirical data for military 
                                                
156 See id. 
157 MARION BOYD, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW: PROTECTING CHOICE, PROMOTING INCLUSION 
(2004), https://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/boyd/executivesummary.html; see 
also Birdsell, supra note 14, at 542 (noting a “traditional objection[] to religious arbitration . . . [is] pre-
dispute pressure to choose religious arbitration”). 
158 Id. (discussing examples of religious arbitration techniques in other contexts that can be used in the 
military context). 
159 See Question 5: Assessing Sincerity, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY (last visited Sept. 12, 2019), 
https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/essays/question-5-assessing-sincerity (discussing the difficulty of 
assessing sincerity). 
160 GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 108. 
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conscientious objectors suggests this argument does not hold water.161 
The Government Accountability Office created a report in 2007 on the 
number of conscientious objectors in the military.162  As a preliminary matter, the 
number of people who applied was quite small.163  The report summarized these 
numbers in a table reproduced below.164
                                                
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
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Table 1: Number of Conscientious Objector Applications Reported, Calendar 
Year 2002—2006 (Reproduced from the Report)165 
 
                                                
165 Id. at 9. 
Component 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total 
Army 25 47 53 33 23 181 
Army 
Reserve 
2 8 14 9 3 36 
Army 
National 
Guard 
1 7 11 7 0 26 
Navy 8 2 3 9 9 31 
Navy 
Reserve 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Air Force 2 15 10 12 6 45 
Air Force 
Reserves 
1 2 1 0 0 4 
Air National 
Guard 
1 1 0 1 2 5 
Marine 
Corps 
8 8 11 6 10 43 
Marine 
Corps 
Reserve 
7 21 14 5 3 50 
Coast 
Guard 
1 1 1 0 0 3 
Coast 
Guard 
Reserve 
0 1 0 0 0 1 
Total 56 113 118 82 56 425 
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As Table 1 shows, the number of people making arguments that a change in 
religious belief should relieve them from their contractual military obligations is 
low.166  
Furthermore, the threshold is high for servicemembers to receive 
discharges.167  “[I]n order to be granted conscientious objector status, 
servicemembers must submit clear and convincing evidence that (1) they are 
opposed to participation in any form of war; (2) their opposition is based on 
religious, ethical, or moral beliefs; (3) their beliefs are sincere and deeply held.”168  
According to the report, the military branches took their obligation to investigate 
seriously, with many investigations lasting close to a year.169  The approval rate 
varied substantially from branch to branch:  The Navy granted 84% of 
applications while the Marine Corps and Coast Guard granted 33%.170  Across all 
branches, applicants had about a 53% chance of their application being 
approved.171  These percentages might seem high, but they must be considered in 
context: Few people asked for them, and the military seriously investigated each 
time.172  From this point-of-view, the percentages seem low.  In total, a mere 224 
applications were approved from 2002 through 2006.173  That means about forty-
four applications were granted each year.  Keep in mind this was during wartime 
when, presumably, the number of people seeking to leave the military each year 
should be high.174 
To understand just how small these numbers are, the report noted there were 
about 2.3 million members of the armed forces.175  This means about 0.00191% of 
servicemembers 
actually seek and obtain conscientious objector status in any given year.176  The 
report even stated the “number is small relative to the [size of the] Armed Forces’ 
total force . . . .”177  “Since 2003, enlisted service members have been leaving the 
                                                
166 Id. at 6. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. (emphasis added). 
169 Id. at 4 (“On average, the components took about 7 months to process an application for a 
servicemember requesting conscientious objector status.  The Air Force Reserve’s process typically took 
the longest, at an average of nearly a full year (357 days), while the Navy’s processing time averaged 
about 5 months (160 days).”). 
170 Id. at 9. 
171 Id. at 4. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 5. 
174 See generally History.com Editors, Conscription, HISTORY (Oct. 13, 2017), 
https://www.history.com/topics/us-government/conscription (discussing the history of draft evasion and 
conscientious objectors).  
175 GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 108, at 1. 
176 See id. 
177 Id. at 3–4. 
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military at a rate of roughly 250,000 each year . . . .”178  Thus, there is no small 
number of people seeking to exit the armed forces.179  In summary, the military 
has not opened the floodgates by allowing conscientious objectors to leave. 
While analogies are never perfect and should be taken with a grain of salt, it 
seems procedures could be put in place, if found desirable, to allow those with 
legitimate religious objections to religious arbitration to escape their contract without 
causing a substantial impact on religious arbitration generally.180  Intuitively, 
people’s motivation to lie about a change of beliefs is probably higher in the military 
than in religious arbitration because servicemembers can potentially escape death 
with such a claim.  Non-legal pressures often make people submit to arbitration 
agreements.181  Indeed, even before arbitration was mainstream, merchants would 
submit to it out of fear that if they did not, it would hurt their reputation.182  As 
discussed in the Introduction of this Article, one of the traditional objections to 
religious arbitration is that it is too coercive—i.e., too many people submit to it, 
sometimes even if they do not want to.183  Thus, it is unlikely that a flood of 
people hoping to escape an arbitration agreement will arise from million 
members of the armed forces.184   
 
B. The Religious Question Doctrine 
 
The second elephant in the room for sincerity determinations is the 
religious question doctrine. Those familiar with the religious question doctrine 
should feel on edge after reading DoDD 1300.06.185  However, courts have, 
subject to much criticism,186 distinguished between adjudicating a party’s 
religious sincerity and deciding a religious question. Indeed, this Article has 
                                                
178 Anna Zogas, US Military Veterans’ Difficult Transition Back to Civilian Life and the VA’s Response, 2–3 
(Brown Univ., 2017), https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/papers/2017/us-military-veterans-difficult-
transitions-back-civilian-life-and-va-s-response. 
179 Id. 
180 See id. (concluding this because of the small amount of servicemembers who seek to obtain conscientious 
objector status). 
181 See BROYDE, supra note 2, at 89 (showing an example of a non-legal pressure). 
182 See id. (“Following merchant agreements, enforcement proved relatively simple, as ‘[p]ractices 
developed among merchants to enforce arbitration awards; the failure to comply with an arbitrator’s 
decision resulted in threats to a merchant’s reciprocal arrangements or to his reputation.’” (modifications 
in the original) (quoting Bruce L. Benson, An Exploration of the Impact of Modern Arbitration Statutes on 
the Development of Arbitration in the United States, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 479, 484 (1995))). 
183 See id. at 233. 
184 Indeed, one student note has suggested Mr. Walter’s argument is overstated in the context of disputes 
involving ministerial employees because a legitimate and significant change of beliefs is unlikely. Birdsell, 
supra note 15, at 544.  
185 See DoDD 1300.06 (2017) (emphasis added). 
186 See generally Chapman, supra note 22 (discussing the court and its role in adjudicating religious 
sincerity).  
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already explained multiple examples of times where courts judged religious 
sincerity without even hinting at the religious question doctrine. This Part does not 
argue that the distinction between determining a religious question and 
determining religious sincerity is well-founded. This Part merely explains the 
distinction to address plausible religious question doctrine counterarguments to 
this Article’s thesis: that courts can inquire into whether a party to a religious 
arbitration agreement has a sincere religious belief that prevents them from 
participating.187 
Professor Nathan S. Chapman recently published an article in the 
Washington Law Review that “defend[ed] and clarif[ied] the sincerity 
requirement.”188  Professor Chapman illustrated the religious sincerity confusion with 
reference to the actions of comedian John Oliver.189  In 2015, Mr. Oliver started a 
“church” called “Our Lady of Perpetual Exemption” to poke fun at how easily 
televangelists could “receive unlimited donations tax-free.”190  Perhaps to Mr. 
Oliver’s surprise, people donated thousands of dollars to Our Lady.191 
  “[Mr.] Oliver claimed the stunt was entirely legal . . . .”192  As Professor 
Chapman explained, 
[i]t wasn’t.  Even considering the IRS’s fuzzy conception of 
“church,” “Our Lady” was missing a crucial component of a 
religious accommodation claim: sincerity. The scheme was, 
of course, a parody. By attempting to expose fraud, [Mr.] 
Oliver may have committed it. 
 
[Mr.] Oliver is not alone in his confusion about the legal 
relevance of a religious accommodation claimant’s 
sincerity. The black-letter law is pretty clear, but scholars 
question it and judges—including Supreme Court justices—
misunderstand it. The rule is simple: to qualify for a 
religious accommodation, a claimant must demonstrate 
sincerity.193 
 
As Professor Chapman argued, religious sincerity is a question of mental 
state and courts may inquire into that mental state “with one caveat: the Constitution 
                                                
187 See Question 5: Assessing Sincerity, GEO. U. (last visited Sept. 12, 2019), 
https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/essays/question-5-assessing-sincerity (discussing the difficulty of 
assessing sincerity). 
188 Chapman, supra note 22, at 1187. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. 
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prohibits courts from inferring insincerity from a religious belief’s inaccuracy or 
implausibility.”194 
 
VI.     CONCLUSION 
 
The state of mind of religious people has been conflated with religion 
itself.195  This fallacy has allowed those opposed to religious arbitration to argue 
for substantial restrictions on it.196  This Article is not intended to argue the pros 
of religious arbitration.  Religious arbitration has various merits, which have been 
discussed comprehensively in other works.197  Professor Broyde’s book, for 
example, has discussed these merits in detail.198  Chief among them is that parties 
to a contract may have religious law in mind and part of contract law’s purpose is 
to enforce those expectations, yet, civil courts are ill-equipped to determine 
religious law.199  Furthermore, religious arbitration is an aspect of some people’s 
faith.200  For example, Jewish law emphasizes a duty to resolve disputes outside of 
secular court.201  One Jewish religious-legal text explains, 
In any place where you find gentile courts, even though their 
law is the same as the Israelite law, you must not resort to 
them since it says, ‘These are the judgments which thou shall 
set before them.’ (Ex. 21:1) this is to say, ‘before them’ and 
not before gentiles.202 
 
By not enforcing a religious arbitration agreement, a sincere religious 
believer may have to jump through additional hoops.203  In a sense, this harms that 
person’s ability to practice his or her faith.204  A court considering a challenge to a 
religious arbitration clause on the ground of a change in religion is faced with a 
                                                
194 Id. at 1191.  
195 See BROYDE, supra note 2, at 233. 
196 See Broyde, supra note 146. 
197 E.g., Robert L. McFarland, Are Religious Arbitration Panels Incompatible with Law? Examining 
“Overlapping Jurisdictions” in Private Law, 4 FAULKNER L. REV. 367, 372 (2013) (“Private agreements 
to arbitrate family disputes before religious tribunals should be enforced (so long as such agreements are 
voluntary) for several secular reasons. First, enforcing such agreements advances legitimate state interests. 
Second, enforcement of such agreements promotes freedom (of religion, speech, association, and 
contract), and freedom is of fundamental importance to our constitutional democracy.”).  
198 See BROYDE, supra note 2. 
199 See BROYDE, supra note 2. 
200 For a detailed discussion of Jewish people’s belief that they should use a beth din for dispute resolution, 
see Ginnine Fried, Comment, The Collision of Church and State: A Primer to Beth Din Arbitration and 
the New York Secular Courts, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 633 (2004) (quoting a translation of TALMUD 
BAVLI, TRACTATE GITTIN 88b). 
201 Id. at 636 (quoting a translation of TALMUD BAVLI, TRACTATE GITTIN 88b). 
202 Id. (quoting a translation of TALMUD BAVLI, TRACTATE GITTIN 88b).  
203 See id. 
204 Id. 
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lose-lose situation.205  Assuming the change in belief is sincere, one party’s 
freedom comes at the expense of another, regardless of how the court rules.206  
Only upon a substantial showing, as discussed in this Article, should a court allow 
freedom of religion to trump freedom of contract.  
It is worth briefly noting another relevant state of mind—bias.  Recall Mr. 
Garcia’s fight with the Church of Scientology discussed above.207  “The church 
declared the Garcias ‘suppressives’ and excommunicated them, according to a legal 
brief submitted by his lawyer.”208  Mr. Garcia pointed to a church doctrine known as 
“disconnection,” which essentially required Scientologists to shun him.209  He 
argued, because of the doctrine, the religious arbitration clauses were substantively 
unconscionable given that he could not receive a “fair and neutral arbitration.”210  
The court rejected this argument, stating, 
[a]s compelling as Plaintiff’s argument might otherwise be, 
the First Amendment prohibits consideration of this 
contention, since it necessarily would require an analysis and 
interpretation of Scientology doctrine. That would constitute a 
prohibited intrusion into religious doctrine, discipline, faith, 
and ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law by the court. Kedroff, 
344 U.S. at 115. Indeed, Plaintiffs earlier acknowledged that 
“[t]he hostility of any Scientologists on [the arbitration panel] . 
. . is church doctrine.” . . . Accordingly, the court has no 
jurisdiction to consider argument.211 
 
Mr. Garcia’s attorney made a fatal error: framing the argument about bias 
in terms of church doctrine.212  Instead, the argument should have been framed as 
whether the particular arbitrators were biased.  The court could have inquired into 
the state of mind of the arbitrators without per se questioning religious doctrine.213  
                                                
205 See id. at 647-50. 
206 Notably, this argument is merely a form of one argument made by many others: Religious arbitration 
promotes freedom of religion. See, e.g., id.  
207 Supra Section II.B. 
208 Corkery & Silver-Greenberg, supra note 45. 
209 Garcia v. Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., Inc., No. 8:13-CV-220-T-27TBM, slip op. at 19 
(M.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2015). 
210 Id. at 19–20. 
211 Id. at 20. 
212 See id. 
213 Contra Dasteel, supra note 35, at 57–58 (“Even if an arbitrator who is a member of the Church of 
Scientology in good standing is required by church doctrine to have an adjudicatory bias against former 
church members, there is nothing a court could do about it when the facially neutral Federal Arbitration 
Act encounters religious doctrine.  Indeed, even after arbitration, a litigant would have considerable 
difficulty challenging an award based on bias because any such finding would require the court to 
investigate the Church of Scientology’s doctrine concerning adjudication of claims with ‘suppressives.’ . . 
. [U]nless the Scientologist-arbitrator makes some demonstrated outward display of bias, the Garcias 
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It would have been similar to a religious sincerity determination. 
For whatever reason, religious arbitration literature has not yet discussed 
the powerful distinction between state of mind and religious questions.  This 
distinction, while a fine line, is seen prominently in other areas of law.  State of 
mind, whether sincerity or bias, should be considered more seriously going 
forward. 
                                                                                                                     
probably could not show actual bias. . . . If this had been a secular arbitration where the arbitrator was 
required to be a member of a secular organization and the rules of that organization  required the arbitrator 
to consider the parties to be ‘suppressive,’ the court would have little trouble in at least considering 
substantive unconscionability.  However, in the context of religious arbitration, it cannot do so on the 
grounds of non-interference with religion.”). 
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